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PART II 
Public Law 
CHAPTER 13 
Constitutional Law 
JOHN D. O'REILLY, JR. 
The survey year was marked by an unusually large number of cases 
disposing of constitutional issues. These ran the gamut from the ques-
tion of the validity of a parking ordinance to that of the legality of the 
urban redevelopment law. 
In the interest of avoiding duplication, some decisions involving 
constitutional law matters are discussed in other chapters. 
§13.1. Constitutional litigation. A case involving some fundamental 
general principles of constitutional pleading and litigation was Wright 
v. Peabody.! Wright, who was proprietor of a trailer coach park, had 
collected from the owners of the trailers which occupied his park the 
monthly license fees provided in General Laws, Chapter 140, Section 
32G, and had tendered the money to the local tax collector. The col-
lector refused the tender on the ground that the trailers had been as-
sessed as real estate, and Wright, as owner of the land on which they 
were located, was liable for the real estate tax under General Laws, 
Chapter 59, Section 3. Wright brought suit against the city and its 
officers for a binding declaration of the validity of General Laws, 
Chapter 140, Section 32G, which provided, in effect, that payment of 
the license fees which the park operator was to collect from trailer 
owners was to be in lieu of property taxes on the trailers themselves. 
The answer of the defendants set forth simply that the statute is "in-
valid and unconstitutional." The Attorney General was notified be-
cause a constitutional question was involved.2 The facts were agreed 
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upon, and the trial judge reported the case without decision. Before 
the Supreme Judicial Court, both Wright and the Attorney General 
argued for the validity of the statute, but the defendants made no ap-
pearance, and offered neither brief nor oral argument. 
In ordering a decree for the plaintiff which required the defendants 
to comply with the statute, the Court rebuked the defendants, who 
"have flouted the act of the Legislature but have not troubled to come 
into this court to present their views." 3 
On the question of invalidity of the statute, the Court went on to say, 
"The categorical assertion of unconstitutionality in the answer is of no 
help in deciding the case. We have not even been told whether the 
allusion is to the State or Federal Constitution or to both." 4 The 
Court nevertheless proceeded to inquire into the legislative history and 
rationale of the statute and to consider a possible basis5 for the con-
tention that the statute is invalid. Not finding any sound basis for such 
a contention, the Court ruled that the statute was valid.6 
Apparently, ignoring the general allegation of unconstitutionality 
is not the only sanction against inadequate presentation of constitu-
tional issues, for in the Wright case the Court ordered a decree which 
would provide for costs, including costs of appeal, against the defend-
ant. 
The opinion does not spell out affirmatively the proper method or 
methods of raising the issue of the constitutionality of a statute. Nor 
would it be feasible to spell out a technique of pleading which could 
be used in all cases to raise such issues. Where, as in the Wright case, 
a plaintiff is suing for enforcement of rights accruing under a statute 
which the defendant conceives to be invalid, the issue might be raised 
in a variety of ways. The defendant might demur to the declaration 
or bill. It is less than clear, however, whether it would be sufficient to 
aver as the ground of demurrer the conventional recital that the bill 
does not set forth a case upon which relief can be granted, or whether 
it is necessary to state specifically that the demurrer is grounded on the 
invalidity of the statute on which the plaintiff's claim of right is based. 
If the issue to be raised is one of validity under the Federal Consti-
tution, and Supreme Court review is anticipated, it would, of course, 
be the part of wisdom to get into the record at this early stage a state-
ment of the claim of federal right, so as to comply with the Supreme 
Court's jurisdictional requirements.7 As far as state practice is con-
cerned, it may well be that a general demurrer, or, as in Wright, a 
general allegation in the answer, when supported and particularized 
"1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 175. 177, 118 N.E.2d 68. 70. 
• Ibid. 
"1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 178, 118 N.E.2d at 70. 
• "At most. the only question presented is whether th:! statute is unconstitutional 
because other people's trailer coaches can no longer be taxed to a park owner as 
part of his real estate. Lacking any support for the affirmative of the proposition, we 
need merely state that we are unable to perceive any constitutional objection." 
1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 178. 118 N.E.2d at 71. 
• Michigan Sugar Co. v. Michigan, 185 U.S. 112.22 Sup. Ct. 581, 46 L. Ed. 829 (1902). 
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§13.2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 115 
by brief and oral argument (which was not the case in Wright), would 
be effective to bring the constitutional issue before the Court. The 
careful pleader, however, will heed the possible implication of the 
Wright opinion, and will see to it that his petition, declaration, demur-
rer, or answer, as the case may be, recites clearly the challenge of the 
constitutionality of the statute and the grounds upon which the chal-
lenge is made.s 
The Court might, in the Wright case, have said an authoritative 
word on a point which the Massachusetts cases leave rather obscure. 
There is considerable doubt as to the standing of a public body or a 
public officer to question the validity of legislation. In Hingham and 
Quincy Corp. v. Norfolk County9 it was indicated that a county could 
not challenge legislation except as it impinged upon the proprietary 
interest of the county in its corporate character.lo In some of the other 
states there is a substantial body of case law on this point.ll 
§13.2. Legislative power: Acquisition and sale of real estate. Two 
cases presented issues involving the scope of the power to transfer pub-
licly owned real estate to private ownership. 
Loomis v. Bostonl was a not unusual type of case, where the legisla-
ture2 had determined that a parcel of land in Boston, originally ac-
quired for park purposes, was no longer needed for those purposes, 
and that the city might sell or lease it to Sears, Roebuck and Co., which 
desired to acquire the land for a parking area as an adjunct to its retail 
store. Two groups of taxpayers filed petitions for mandamus and in-
junction to prevent the transfer which had been authorized by the 
statute. 
The Court had little difficulty in denying the petitions. Although 
the deeds conveying part of the land contained the words "for the 
purposes of a public park," the Court did not find it necessary to in-
quire whether the proposed transfer would impair the obligation of 
contract, since it concluded that the words in the deeds did not estab-
lish a trust, the city having paid a substantial consideration for the 
deeds. The only issue remaining was whether the legislature had "ar-
bitrarily or whimsically" exercised its power to determine that the 
land in question was no longer needed for park purposes. The Court 
ruled that, on the record, the petitioners had failed to sustain the 
burden of proof. 
A much more serious problem, with implications of widespread ap-
plication, was involved in Papadinis v. Somerville.s This case pre-
• On the general subject of pleading in constitutional litigation. see Culp. Methods 
of Attacking Unconstitutional Legislation. 22 Va. L. Rev. 723. 891 (1936). 
• 6 Allen 353. 357. 358 (1863). 
10 See also Greenaway's Case. 319 Mass. 121. 123.55 N.E.2d 16. 17 (1946). 
11 16 C.J.S. 172 et seq. 
§13.2. '1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 141. 117 N.E.2d 539. 
2 Acts of 1951. c. 199. 
81954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 725.121 N.E.2d 714. 
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sented the question of the validity of the urban redevelopment law.4 
Under that statute the power of eminent domain may be used to 
facilitate real estate development by private owners. The statutory 
scheme is for a local housing authority, after executing a "co-operation 
agreement" with the city, to acquire, by purchase or condemnation, the 
land in a "substandard" or "decadent" area.5 The land cost would 
be paid partly out of city funds, pursuant to the cooperation agree-
ment, and partly by a federal grant.6 The same would be true of the 
cost of clearing the land. Once the land has been acquired and 
cleared, the housing authority may sell it to a private person for de-
velopment and operation pursuant to a "redevelopment plan" ap-
proved by the authority. 
A "jurisprudence of labels" might characterize this as condemnation 
of land for private use and find it invalid. Certainly, if the city had 
acquired the land involved in the Loomis case for the purpose of mak-
ing it available to Sears, Roebuck and Co., the project would have 
been of extremely doubtful validity.7 
In Papadinis the Court sustained the statute on the narrow ground 
that slum clearance is a proper objective of governmental power. 
That, of course, had already been determined.s That the land was ul-
timately to be turned over to private ownership, the Court went on to 
hold, was merely incidental to the main purpose of slum clearance, 
and was therefore not forbidden. 
Urban redevelopment legislation is a radical cure for a cancerous 
growth which has afflicted all of our larger cities, and even most of our 
smaller communities. Inept land-use developments, neglect, and 
financial difficulties have combined to make large urban areas blighted. 
By hindsight, much, if not all, of this could have been prevented by 
good city-planning legislation, which would undoubtedly have been 
within the police power of the state.9 But there was no planning legis-
lation when our cities were growing. The result has been unregulated 
development, and most planning laws can provide only patchwork 
regulation. The best they can do is to retard the growth of existing 
blight, not excise it. 
The new type of legislation embodied in the urban redevelopment 
law uses the power of eminent domain to supplement the police 
power, by enabling public authority to take affirmative action in es-
tablishing stability of property values. 
An over-all evaluation of urban redevelopment might well be made 
• G.L., c. 121, §§26JJ·26MM. 
• Id. §26J. 
"42 U.S.C. §§1451 et seq. 
7 See Salisbury Land and Improvement Co. v. Commonwealth, 215 Mass. 371, 102 
N.E. 619 (1913). But the two cases are not parallel in any real sense. 
8 Allydonn Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Housing Authority, 304 Mass. 288, 23 N.E.2d 
665 (1939). 
• Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 Sup. Ct. 1I4, 71 L. Ed. 303, 54 
A.L.R. 1016 (1926); Zahn v. Los Angeles, 274 U.S. 325, 47 Sup. Ct. 594, 71 L. Ed. 1074 
(1927). 
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in the light of a much broader perspective than that in which the sub-
ject was viewed in Papadinis. There should be taken into account 
not only the negative benefit to the community from the elimination of 
slums, but also the other advantages, both economic and imponder-
able,lo of properly planned use. Also not irrelevant is the fact that the 
private parties to whom publicly condemned land is sold pursuant to 
a redevelopment plan will be in most, if not all, cases limited divi-
dend companies organized under General Laws, Chapter 121A, which 
will be subject to rather close supervision in the public interest, or 
companies operating under similar special acts. 
In Papadinis the Court expressly reserved judgment on the validity 
of that portion of the law which provides for application of the statu-
tory scheme to an "open blighted area," i.e., one from which there is 
no slum to remove, because there is nothing to be removed. Whether 
the factors suggested above would be decisive of this point is not clear, 
but it is to be hoped that they will be considered when the issue is 
presented to the Court. 
§13.3. Federal-state relations: Fishery regulation. Commonwealth 
v. Trott 1 involved a variety of problems under the commerce, treaty, 
and equal protection clauses of the Federal Constitution. 
The case was a prosecution for fishing with trawls in a manner pro-
hibited by state conservation law2 in the waters off Monomoy Island. 
Title to the island was in the United States by virtue of a condemna-
tion decree under the Migratory Bird Conservation Act,3 but state 
jurisdiction had not been ceded either by the general cession act4 or 
by any other statute. 
It being agreed that most of the fish caught in Massachusetts waters 
by the defendants "enter into the stream of interstate commerce," the 
defendants argued that the statute, as applied to them, violated the 
commerce clause by diminishing the total quantity of fish which would 
go into commerce. The Court rejected this contention, stating that 
the statute is a conservation measure, not a regulation of commerce. 
Citing cases which dealt with state taxes on interstate carriers, the 
Court stated, "Not every law that affects commerce is a regulation of it 
in a constitutional sense." 5 
Although the quotation is subject to criticism as being made out of 
context, the conclusion is unquestionably sound. A state is not to be 
forbidden to regulate a commodity before it becomes an article of 
commerce simply because it is or may be destined for interstate ship-
ment. Although the reasons for the decision set forth in the opinion 
10 General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Public Works, 289 Mass. 149, 
193 N.E. 799 (1935). 
§13.3. 11954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 559, 120 N.E.2d 289. 
• Acts of 1936, c. 238. 
816 U.S.C. §§715 et seq. 
~G.L., c. 1, §7. 
51954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 559, 563, 120 N.E.2d 289, 292, citing Galveston, Harrisburg 
& San Antonio Ry. Co. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217, 28 Sup. Ct. 63R, 52 L. Ed. 1031 (1908); 
City of Chicago v. Willett Co., 344 U.S. 574,73 Sup. Ct. 460, 97 L. Ed. 559 (1953). 
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in Kidd v. Pearson6 would hardly be persuasive today, there is no rea-
son to believe that the decision itself (that a state may forbid the man-
ufacture of alcoholic beverages, even for shipment outside the state) 
is not good law, regardless of the Twenty-first Amendment. The com-
merce clause does not forbid the states to regulate potential subjects 
of commerce within their boundaries; it simply forbids regulation of 
them in a discriminatory way.7 
The next argument of the defendants in Trott was that the statute 
was inapplicable because the vessels from which the fishing complained 
of was done were enrolled and licensed under federallaw. 8 This con-
tention was also rejected, since it differs little from the contention 
made and rejected in Smith v. Maryland. 9 In any event, said the 
Court, the Act of Congress "does not purport to regulate the taking of 
fish, but deals only with the subject of shipping." 10 
The next contention of the defendants posed a more difficult prob-
lem. By proclamation the President established a national policy of 
preventing depletion of fishery resources by the making of interna-
tional agreements, where appropriate, and by the establishment of 
conservation areas where only American nationals are allowed to en-
gage in coastal fishing. By supplemental executive order the appro-
priate cabinet secretaries were requested to suggest conservation zones 
to be defined by future executive orders. The defendants contended 
that by the proclamation and the executive order the Federal Govern-
ment had "occupied the field" of conservation of the coastal fisheries, 
so that the state laws on the subject were superseded. The Court re-
jected this contention on the ground that no specific executive orders 
appear to have been issued to implement the policy declared in the 
proclamation and executive order above referred to. 
A simi liar contention by the defendants was based upon the signing 
by the United States of the International Convention for the North-
west Atlantic Fisheries. This contention was rejected because the Con-
vention expressly provided that it should become operative "upon the 
deposit of instruments of ratification by the four signatory Govern-
ments," an event which did not take place until after the date of the 
offense complained of. 
In rejecting these latter two contentions, the Court did not advert 
to the confusion which exists in the decisions on the issue as to when 
the Federal Government may be said to have occupied a given field so 
as to make inoperative existing or future state laws in the field. 
There is authority that state power ends when Congress makes a de-
termination of policy, even though its actual exercise of regulatory 
8128 U.S. 1,9 Sup. Ct. 6, 32 L. Ed. 346 (1888). 
• Compare Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 55 Sup. Ct. 497, 79 L. Ed. 
1032 (1935); Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U.S. 346, 59 Sup. 
Ct. 528, 83 L. Ed. 752 (1939), rehearing denied, 306 U.S. 669 (1939); H. P. Hood &: Sons 
v. Du Mond 336 U.S. 525, 69 Sup. Ct. 657, 93 L. Ed. 865 (1949). 
"46 U.S.C. §§251, 263, 319. 
918 How. 71, 15 L. Ed. 269 (U.S. 1855). 
10 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 559, 563, 120 N.E.2d 289, 292. 
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power is postponed until a later date.ll On the other hand, it has been 
held that mere expression of federal policy is not enough; there must 
also be direct imposition of federal authority before state laws are ren-
dered ineffective.12 Very likely many of the cases in these two lines of 
authority are distinguishable from one another. The Trott decision 
does not explain why the second doctrine, rather than the first, is ap-
plicable in the fisheries situation. 
An alternative ground of decision on the treaty point was that, in 
any event, the Massachusetts statute was not inconsistent with the 
terms of the treaty. In this matter, too, there is more than one current 
of authority. In some instances a state law has been superseded by the 
enactment of an act of Congress on the same subject, even though the 
two statutes are substantially alike.13 In other instances a state law 
which in substance adds state sanctions against violations of a federal 
law within the state has been sustained.14 Selection of the appropriate 
rule is important in a number of areas. For example, of current in-
terest is the question of the validity of the antisubversion laws in many 
of the states in the light of not inconsistent federal laws on the subject 
- a question which, at the present writing, is pending before the Su-
preme Court of the United States.15 
A final defense contention in the Trott case was based on the equal 
protection clause of the Federal Constitution. The Massachusetts stat-
ute forbade dragging for fish with beam or otter trawls. It did not 
forbid the use of nets or seines, which may have a much greater capac-
ity than trawls. Thus, it was argued, the statute made a classification 
which was unrelated to a conservation objective. The Court was not 
persuaded. For all that appears, it reasoned,' the statute may represent 
a legislative determination that a small mobile trawl is likely to gather 
in more fish than a larger stationary net. The Court was unable to say 
that such a determination would have been unreasonable. 
§13.4. The "Iron Curtain" statute. The Massachusetts "Iron Cur-
tain" statu tel was sustained in Petitions of Mazurowski2 against the 
contention that it was in conflict with a treaty with Poland 3 and with 
the due process clause of the Federal Constitution. 
The statute provides that where a legacy or distributive share cannot 
be paid to the person entitled thereto, or where such person may not 
11 Erie R.R. Co. v. New York, 233 U.S. 671, 34 Sup. Ct. 756,58 L. Ed. 1149, 52 L.R.A. 
(N.S.) 266 (1914). 
,. H. P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79, 59 Sup. Ct. 438, 83 L. Ed. 500 
(1939). 
'" See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 Sup. Ct. 399,85 L. Ed. 581 (1941). 
1< See California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 69 Sup. Ct. 841, 93 L. Ed. 1005 (1949), rehear-
ing denied, 337 U.S. 921 (1949). 
15 See Commonwealth v. Nelson, 377 Pa. 58, 104 A.2d 133 (1954); d. Nelson v. 
Wyman, - N.H. -, 105 A.2d 756 (1954). 
§13.4. 1 C.L., c. 206, §27A. See editorial note, Estates and "the Iron Curtain," 35 
Mass. L.Q., No.2, p. 34 (1950). 
• 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 35, 116 N.E.2d 854. 
• 48 Stat., Pt. 2, 1507 (1933). 
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receive or have the opportunity to obtain such legacy or distributive 
share, the Probate Court may order the money deposited in a bank. 
When the claimant resides outside the United States, the court may 
require the personal appearance of the claimant "in order to assist in 
establishing such claimant's identity, right and opportunity to receive 
such fund." 4 
Mazurowski, whose nationality is not revealed by the record, died a 
resident of Massachusetts. His next of kin were Polish nationals and 
resided in Poland. Through the Polish Consul General they brought 
petitions for their distributive shares. The probate judge, on his own 
motion, made inquiries of the United States Department of State and 
was advised that dollar remittances to Poland are retained by the 
Polish Government, which pays to the persons to whom the remittances 
are directed Polish currency at the rate of four zlotys to the dollar. 
(The Supreme Judicial Court, in response to a similiar inquiry ad-
dressed to the Department of Justice, was informed that the prevailing 
"free" rate of exchange was approximately twenty zlotys to the dol-
lar.) The probate judge thereupon made an order requiring the per-
sonal appearance in court of the claimants, and continued the case un-
til they should appear. He found as a fact that, at the present time, it 
is practically impossible for any of the claimants to come from Poland 
to Massachusetts. 
The statute, as thus applied, was attacked as being inconsistent with 
the terms of the treaty. That instrument provided that nationals of 
either government should have power to dispose of their personal 
property, and that their heirs and legatees, wherever resident, should 
succeed to such property and might take possession thereof. 
The Supreme Judicial Court pointed out that, in the first place, 
there was no showing that the decedent was a Polish national, so that 
there was some question of the relevance of the treaty provision. But, 
in any event, the Court went on, the treaty "did not purport to create 
special rights of succession in favor of aliens." 5 The Polish heir must 
pursue his right to obtain possession of his distributive share in accord-
ance with the general laws of the state governing the distribution of 
the estates of deceased residents. The statute in question, the Court 
concluded, is such a general law. It regulates the distribution of es-
tates by establishing a procedure designed to insure that the persons 
entitled will actually receive their distributive shares. There is, thus, 
no conflict with the treaty. 
The claimants' alternative contention was that the statute denied 
due process because, in its practical operation, it entirely deprives 
legatees and next of kin resident in Poland of their legacies and dis-
tributive shares. The Court felt that this was an unduly pessimistic 
position to take. Pointing out that in form the order was simply a 
temporary suspension of distribution, the Court refused to agree that 
it amounted, as yet at any rate, to a denial of the right to distribution. 
• G.L., c. 206, §27A. 
"1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 35, 38, 116 N.E.2d 854, 857. 
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The opinion of Chief Justice Qua hopefully speculates: "The world 
is still in a state of flux and uncertainty. It is still possible that more 
nearly normal relations will be resumed between nations. It is pos-
sible that a more realistic rate of exchange will be officially adopted in 
Poland. Many unforeseen events may profoundly alter present condi-
tions." 6 
Neither the language of the statute nor that of the opinion deals 
with the basic legal relations and problems involved. The statute is, 
fundamentally, a protest and a device of retaliation against the sump-
tuary and oppressive measures of the Soviet Government and its satel-
lites. Viewed in this light, it would raise many complex problems 
under our constitutional division of labor between the nation and the 
states. The decision to view it in another light is suggestive of, or per-
haps suggested by, the technique of sustaining such things as federal 
regulation of intrastate gambling by pointing out that the regulation 
is a by-product of an exercise of the taxing power.7 
§13.5. Tenure of school teachers and the privilege against self-
incrimination. The scope and implications of the constitutional privi-
lege against self-incrimination were before the Court in Faxon v. 
School Committee of Boston.! Faxon, a master in a Boston public 
school, had been asked questions by a United States Senate subcom-
mittee concerning membership in and/or connection with the Com-
munist Party. He declined to answer, asserting his privilege under the 
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The school com-
mittee determined that this was "conduct unbecoming a teacher" or 
"other good cause" within the meaning of General Laws, Chapter 71, 
Section 42, and dismissed him. Faxon brought mandamus for rein-
statement, and the Court ordered the petition dismissed. 
Faxon contended that (1) the school committee improperly drew 
inferences of guilt from his refusal to testify, and (2) the action of 
the school committee was in derogation of his privilege under the 
Fifth Amendment. 
To the first contention the Court retorted that " ... the question 
here is not one of guilt or innocence." 2 Pointing to the broad discre-
tionary power of school committees under Chapter 71 of the General 
Laws, and to the fact that no legal controls could prevent members of 
the public from drawing their own inferences from refusals to testify, 
the Court stated: "The school committee could find that a great many 
parents and others would be seriously disturbed if the petitioner 
were allowed to continue teaching, and that this would undermine 
public confidence and react unfavorably upon the school system." 3 
In this light, the argument continued, the case is the same as if the 
81954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 41, 116 N.E.2d at 859. 
7 United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 732 Sup. Ct. 510, 97 L. Ed. 754 (1953), re-
hearing denied, 345 U.s. 931 (1953). 
§13.5. 11954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 613, 120 N.E.2d 772. 
21954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 615, 120 N.E.2d at 774. 
8 Ibid. 
9
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teacher had been dismissed because he had suffered "a terribly disfig-
uring personal injury." In either case, "the best interests of the schools 
are paramount." 4 
To the second contentiOol1 there was a flatter retort. This was an-
other case for application of the well·known epigram of Mr. Justice 
Holmes: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk poli-
tics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." 5 
It has become settled law that, subject to rather indefinite limita-
tions,6 a person taking or continuing in public employment may, as a 
condition thereof, be required to waive some of his constitutional 
rights.7 It was contended by Faxon that the waiver which may be re-
quired must be set forth in a statute, ordinance, or regulation. He 
argued that, because there was at the time he was interrogated by the 
Senate subcommittee no regulation of the school committee forbid-
ding teachers to claim privilege, it was improper for the school com-
mittee to dismiss him for claiming the privilege. This contention 
seems to be based upon the apparent development of a pattern of 
statutory provisions or administrative regulations governing public em-
ployees or particular categories of such employees. Thus, the New 
York City CharterR provides for dismissal of a municipal employee 
who, when subjected to questioning, claims privilege or refuses to sign 
a waiver of immunity.9 The City of Los Angeles Charter10 establishes 
ineligibility for municipal office or employment of those who advise, 
advocate, or teach, or become "affiliated" with any organization which 
advises, advocates, or teaches violent overthrow of government. The 
charter was implemented by an ordinancell requiring employees to 
take oaths that they do not and will not, while employees, advise, 
advocate, or teach, nor are or will become members of or affiliated 
with organizations which advise, advocate, or teach violent overthrow 
of government. The ordinance also requires affidavits with respect to 
present or past membership in the Communist Party.12 
The Court rejected Faxon's contention, saying, "In a constitu-
tional sense it seems to us to make no difference whether a teacher is 
dismissed because of statutory provisions expressly providing for such 
dismissal or, as in the present case, by an order of a public board act-
ing within its statutory authority." 13 (Emphasis supplied.) 
The soundness of this proposition, at least in a context of asserted 
• 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 616, 120 N.E.2d at 774. 
5 McAuliffe v. Mayor and Aldermen of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 
517 (1892). 
• See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 66 Sup. Ct. 1073, 90 L. Ed. 1252 (1946). 
• United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.s. 75, 67 Sup. Ct. 556, 91 L. Ed. 754 
(1947). 
8 Chapter 903. 
• Daniman v. Board of Education, 306 N.Y. 532, 119 N.E.2d 373 (1954). 
'" California Stat., c. 67 (1941). 
11 Los Angeles Ordinance No. 94,004. 
12 See Garner v. Los Angeles Board of Public Works, 341 U.s. 716, 7I Sup. Ct. 909, 
95 L. Ed. 1317 (1951). 
'" 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 613, 618, 120 N.E.2d 772, 775. 
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federal constitutional rights, may be debatable. In the Los Angeles 
case14 the Supreme Court was careful to point out that its decision sus-
taining the requirement of oaths by municipal employees was lim-
ited to cases where the oath was required with reference to periods of 
time subsequent to the date of the amendment of the charter.15 There 
was a strong intimation, though not a positive decision, that there 
would be constitutional difficulties with an oath requirement which 
would entail dismissal for advising, advocating, or teaching violent 
overthrow of government at a time before the enactment of the stat-
ute.16 
Indeed, the Supreme Court felt it necessary to "assume" that the 
oath requirement was substantially qualified, and that it would not be 
construed "as affecting adversely those persons who during their affilia-
tion with a proscribed organization were innocent of its purpose, or 
those who severed their relations with any such organization when its 
character became apparent, or those who were affiliated with organiza-
tions which at one time or another during the period covered by the 
ordinance were engaged in proscribed activity but not at the time of 
affiant's affiliation." 17 
The Court in the Faxon case recognized that the aphorism that 
there- is no "constitutional right to be a policeman" is not, alone, a 
sufficient basis of decision of the constitutional problem posed in the 
case. There is, for example, a difference between disbarring an at-
torney18 or removing a judge19 and discharging a teacher or a police-
man20 for assertion of privilege or refusal to sign a waiver of immunity. 
It was indicated by the Court that public authority may insist upon 
surrender by public officers and employees of "constitutional rights 
the exercise of which was deemed inconsistent with obligations volun-
tarily assumed in connection with their public employment." 
In the Faxon case the Court felt that "the inconsistency between the 
duty of a teacher in the public schools and the exercise of the right 
not to incriminate oneself with respect to association with communist 
organizations is fully as great as in the instances of a policeman or a 
fireman who asserts similar rights with respect to other activities." 21 
The Faxon case will probably be only one of a series of cases which 
will have to be brought to determine the extent of the power of gov-
ernment to refuse employment or to discharge employees for hetero-
dox (including subversive) activities or opinions. / 
§13.6. Religious test in adoption. In Petitions of Goldman1 the 
H Garner v. Los Angeles Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 71 Sup. Ct. 909, 95 
L. Ed. 1317 (1951). 
15 341 U.S. at 720, 71 Sup. Ct. at 913, 95 L. Ed. at 1323. 
1·341 U.S. at 720, 721, 71 Sup. Ct. at 913, 95 L. Ed. at 1323. 
17 341 U.S. at 723, 71 Sup. Ct. at 914, 95 L. Ed. at 1323 (1951). 
18 Matter of Grae, 282 N.Y. 428, 26 N.E.2d 963 (1940). 
,. In re Holland, 377 Ill. 346, 36 N.E.2d 543 (1941). 
20 Daniman v. Board of Education, 306 N.Y. 532, 119 N.E.2d 373 (1954) . 
., 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 613, 617, 120 N.E.2d 772, 775. 
§13.6. '1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 745, 121 N.E.2d 843. 
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Court faced issues based on the provisions of the federal and state 
constitutions concerning an "establishment of religion" and the "free 
exercise thereof." These involved the requirement2 that, in making 
orders for the adoption of children the adoption court must "when 
practicable," give custody only to persons of the same religious faith 
as that of the child. 
The Goldmans, a Jewish couple who were otherwise qualified to 
adopt a child, filed petitions for the adoption of twin infants whose 
mother was a Catholic. (The statute provides that, if the religion of 
a child is in dispute, its religion shall be deemed to be that of its 
mother.) The mother assented to the petitions, knowing that the pe-
titioners were Jewish and that the children were to be raised in the 
Jewish faith. There was evidence that there were in the area Catholic 
couples who were qualified and who were desirous of adopting chil-
dren of the type of the twins. The trial judge made findings that it 
would not be to the best interests of the children to issue a decree of 
adoption, and dismissed the petitions. 
The petitioners' principal contentions were that (1) the statute 
abridges the mother's free exercise of religion by limiting her freedom 
to determine the religious faith in which her children be reared, and 
(2) the statute, by requiring identity of religious faith of adopting 
parents and adopted children, violates the constitutional prohibition 
of "an establishment of religion." The Court rejected both conten-
tions, and affirmed the dismissal of the petitions. 
Chief Justice Qua did not find it necessary to determine to what 
extent a parent has a constitutional right to direct the religious up-
bringing of his child.3 The point, he held, was not reached because, 
under the statute, an adoption terminates a natural parent's control 
of the child.4 In making this disposition of the contention, the Court 
did not discuss the petitioners' standing to put into issue the consti-
tutional rights of the mother, who was not a party to the proceeding.5 
The other contention, that the statute involves a forbidden establish-
ment of religion, was disposed of as briefly. Said the Court: "All 
religions are treated alike. There is no 'subordination' of one sect to 
another. No burden is placed upon anyone for maintenance of any 
religion. No exercise of religion is required, prevented, or ham-
pered." 6 
The Court did not enter explicitly into a discussion of the formula 
of the "wall of separation of church and state," and the esoteric ap-
plications of that formula made by the Supreme Court of the United 
States.7 
• G.L., c. 210, §58. 
• Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 Sup. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070 (1925). 
• C.L., c. 210, §6. 
5 Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 63 Sup. Ct. 493, 87 L. Ed. 603 (1943); Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, supra note 3. 
61954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 745,749,121 N.E.2d 843, 846. 
1 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1,67 Sup. Ct. 504,91 L. Ed. 711 (1947); 
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The opinion points out that the adoption statutes of many other 
states contain requirements that adopting parents be of the same re-
ligious faith as their adopted children.s It is not clear whether this 
reflects a belief that Zorach (which involved "dismissed time" from 
the public schools for religious instruction) signifies a practical ending 
of the Supreme Court's attempts to effect a complete disassoci-
ation of church and state under the "wall of separation" formula, or 
if it regards the widespread acceptance of the religious faith test in 
adoption statutes as evidence that this, like dismissed time, is by com-
mon acceptance one of the grounds on which church and state may 
meet. 
The decision seems a more realistic approach to whatever church-
state problems the constitutions pose than those which attempt literal 
application of the sweeping generalization of Mr. Justice Black in 
the Everson case: "Neither a state nor the Federal Government can 
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all 
religions, or prefer one religion over another." 9 
§13.7. Miscellaneous references. Constitutional questions gener-
ally arise in terms of the substantive law of various other fields of law. 
Because of space limitations and the topical scheme of development 
of the material in the SURVEY, various significant constitutional law 
matters are discussed in other chapters. Some of the more important 
matters are pointed out in the conclusion of this chapter. 
The prohibition of laws impairing the obligation of contract was 
the basis of two cases 1 which challenged the validity of the repeal of 
legislation which extended the benefits of retirement pension systems 
to members of the legislature, to the executive council, and to elected 
constitutional officers who desired to avail themselves of such benefits. 
These cases, which sustained the repealer, are discussed in Chap-
ter 24.2 
Cases involving procedural due process in criminal cases and the 
pretrail conduct of public officers are examined in Chapter 15.3 
Questions involving the powers of legislative committees and com-
missions to punish for contempt, and power of one General Court to 
bind another General Court on the employment of assistants to stand-
ing committees are discussed in Chapter 24.4 
McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 68 Sup. Ct. 461, 92 L. Ed. 649 (1948); 
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 72 Sup. Ct. 679, 96 L. Ed. 954 (1952). 
8 See 54 Col. L. Rev. 376 (1954), referring to the Zoraeh case supra. 
• 330 U.S. I, 15, 67 Sup. Ct. 504, 511, 91 L. Ed. 711, 723 (1947). See, for an extreme 
example, People ex reI. Bormat v. Bieek, 405 Ill. 510, 91 N.E.2d 588 (1950). See also 
Tudor v. Board of Education, 14 N.J. 31, 100 A.2d 857 (1953), cert. denied sub nom. 
Gideons International v. Tudor, 348 U.S. 816, 75 Sup. Ct. 25, 99 L. Ed. Adv. Sh. 27 
(1954). 
§13.7. 1 Roach v. State Board of Retirement, 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 43, 116 N.E.2d 
850; McCarthy v. State Board of Retirement, 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 47, 116 N.E.2d 852. 
2 Section 24.6. 
• Sections 15.4-15.6. 
• Sections 24.1 and 24.6 respectively. 
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